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Isolated Waters and the Clean Water Act After SWANCC:
What Does the Commerce Clause Have to Do with It?
Thomas Michael Swett*
I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers' (SWANCC)
called into question long standing regulations promulgated by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) defining "waters of the United States" for the
purposes of section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA),2 Specifically, the Court
held that the Corps' use of the Migratory Bird Rule3 to assert section 404
jurisdiction over a partially •flooded,
abandoned gravel pit in Illinois exceeded the
4
agency's statutory authority. Hence, this "isolated water ''5 was not subject to
section 404 regulation.
On January 15, 2003, the Corps published in the Federal Register an
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) soliciting input on the proper
definition of "waters of the United States" for the purposes of section 404
regulation. The Corps posed two questions in order to focus commentary. First,
it asked whether any other factor contained in the current definition of "waters of
the United States" could be used to justify jurisdiction over isolated waters.8 And
second, it asked whether the regulations should define "isolated waters," and if

* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2004; M.S., Forest
Products, Oregon State University, Corvallis, 1997; B.S., Natural Resource Management, University of Nevada,
Reno, 1994.
1. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)
[hereinafter SWANCC].
2. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2003). Although section 404's regulation of "dredge and fill" activities may
sound mundane, section 404 is in fact the federal government's primary protective device for wetlands. J. Brian
Smith, Comment, Western Wetlands: The Backwater of Wetlands Regulation, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J.357, 37986(1999).
3. Conditions that would trigger jurisdiction under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) included habitat for birds
covered by migratory bird treaties and later became known as the "Migratory Bird Rule." Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Waters of the United States," 68 Fed.
Reg. 1991, 1994 (Jan. 15, 2003) [hereinafter ANPR].
4. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
5. The term "isolated water" has become shorthand for those wetlands that are encompassed by the
SWANCC decision. See id. at 170-71 (discussing the Corps' jurisdiction over "isolated waters"); ANPR, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 1994 (stating that the Court's holding "eliminates... jurisdiction over isolated, interstate, non-navigable
waters where the sole basis for asserting ...
jurisdiction is the ...use of the waters as habitat for migratory
birds that cross State lines").
6. ANPR, 68 Fed. Reg. 1991. The Corps subsequently extended the comment period and has yet to issue
a final rule. 68 Fed. Reg. 9613 (Feb. 28, 2003).
7. ANPR, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1994.
8. Id.
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so, what factors should be included in the definition.9 This Comment will use
primarily Supreme Court precedent to examine each of these questions.
II. ALTERNATIVES TO THE MIGRATORY BIRD RULE

The explicit holding in SWANCC is specific to the facts of the case and the
precise regulatory justification used by the Corps to invoke its jurisdiction.' 0 The
Court held "that 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1999), as clarified and applied to
petitioner's balefill site pursuant to the 'Migratory Bird Rule,' 51 Fed. Reg.
41217 (1986), exceeds the authority granted to [the Corps] under § 404(a) of the
[Clean Water Act]."" Perhaps because of this specificity, the Corps sought
comment on the feasibility of using an alternative Commerce Clause justification
under 33 C.F.R. section 328.3(a)(3) for the assertion of jurisdiction.12 The
subparts of section 328.3(a) purportedly provide for CWA jurisdiction over
waters that "are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational
or other purposes; or [f]rom which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold
in interstate or foreign commerce; or [w]hich are used or could be used for
industrial purpose by industries in interstate commerce."'' 3 In order to respond to
the Corps' inquiry, it is necessary to examine the reasoning of the SWANCC
decision.
A. The Meaning of SWANCC
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) is a4
collection of municipalities associated for the purposes of garbage disposal.
SWANCC purchased a 533-acre abandoned gravel pit entirely within the state of
Illinois for the disposal of non-hazardous baled waste.' 5 Since mining operations
had been abandoned for decades, portions of the pit contained permanent pools
of water and vegetation, including trees." During the process of permitting the
new landfill, SWANCC consulted with the Corps, who initially concluded that
the site was not within their CWA jurisdiction."' After further inquiry, the Corps
reversed itself, claimed jurisdiction over the project, and subsequently denied
SWANCC a permit under section 404."' The assertion of jurisdiction was based
on its findings that "the water areas and spoil piles had developed a natural
9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
Id.
ANPR, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1994.
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)(i)-(iii) (internal subdivisions omitted).
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162-63.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 165.
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character" and that "the water areas are used as habitat by migratory bird [sic]
which cross state lines."' 9
SWANCC filed suit alleging that the use of the Migratory Bird Rule to assert
jurisdiction over a nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate water such as the gravel pit
in question exceeded the statutory authority of the Corps or, in the alternative, the
statute exceeded the Commerce Clause authority of Congress.20 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the assertion of jurisdiction
to be proper, leading to the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari and subsequent
reversal.2
The Court was called on to decide if the waters wholly contained in a
manmade pit fell within the scope of the statute.22 The text of section 404(a) gives
the Corps the power to regulate dredge and fill operations affecting "navigable
waters. 23 The term "navigable waters" is further defined by statute as "the waters
of the United States, including the territorial seas." 24 The Court recognized that it
had previously held that the definitional term "navigable" is of "limited import."25
This prior conclusion ratified Corps regulations subjecting nonnavigable wetlands
adjacent to waters navigable in fact" to section 404(a). 27 But the question the Court
had previously reserved was the propriety of asserting jurisdiction over wetlands
not reasonably adjacent to navigable bodies of water. 2' That is, the Court did not
express an opinion on those wetlands that do not have a "significant nexus" with
navigable waters. 29 The wetlands in SWANCC's gravel pit lacked this "significant
nexus," giving the Court reason to decide this issue.
The Corps offered a number of arguments in an attempt to persuade the
Court to extend its prior precedent to include the SWANCC gravel pit. The Corps
was not able to persuade the Court that Congress had intended to authorize its
expansive regulatory definition of "navigable waters" as any and all "waters of
the United States." It also did not demonstrate that Congress acquiesced to its
promulgated regulations." The failure of a 1977 bill intended to overturn the
regulatory definition of "waters of the United States" was not enough to

19. Id. at 164-65.
20. Id. at 165-66.
21. Id. at 166.
22. Id. at 167.
23. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C § 1344(a) (2001)).
24. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2001)).
25. Id. (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985)).
26. Id. Federal regulation of the Nation's waterways was historically based on the power of Congress to
regulate those waters capable of being used in interstate commerce-those that were "navigable in fact." Id. at
172. A stream may be "navigable in fact" simply because it is deep enough to float a log, thereby transporting it
to a sawmill and into commerce. United States v. Appalachian Elec. PowerCo., 311 U.S. 377, 405-06 (1940).
27. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 172 (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 135-39).
28. Id. at 167-68 (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131-32 n.8).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 168-70.
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demonstrate Congress's "acquiescence" to the Corps' interpretation." Consequently,
even though the Court let stand its prior conclusion that the term "navigable" was of
"limited import," it was not willing to read it completely out of the statute.12 ,[I]t is
one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to give it no effect
whatever. The term 'navigable' has at least the import of showing us what
Congress had in mind. . . ."" "In order to rule for respondents here, we would
have to hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that are not
adjacent to open water. But we conclude that the text of the statute will not allow
this." 4
The Corps also asked the Court to extend Chevron deference35 to its
regulations." Although the Court stated that it believed the scope of the statute to
be clear, it nevertheless engaged in an analysis of the issue. It is here, in dicta, that
the Court raised issues concerning the constitutionality of a statute that would
allow the Corps to exercise section 404 jurisdiction over the waters in question.37
Without deciding whether the existing regulations would be a proper exercise of
Commerce Clause authority or impermissibly impact federalism, the Court
concluded that an arguably ambiguous statute cannot support such an expansive
regulatory definition.38 Absent clear congressional authorization, the Court was not
willing to allow an agency to push the outer limits of Congress's constitutional
power.39 "We thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant constitutional
and federalism question raised by [the Corps'] interpretation, and therefore reject
the request for administrative deference."' Though the Court raised questions
(bordering on doubts) about the ability of Congress to regulate isolated waters
under the Commerce Clause post-Morrison and post-Lopez, no final conclusions
were drawn.'
Unfortunately for the Corps and its search for an interstate commerce
alternative to the Migratory Bird Rule, SWANCC is not a constitutional decision
but is instead one based on statutory construction. Even though the Court raises
issues concerning the Commerce Clause and the balance of power between states

31. Id. at 170.
32. Id. at 172.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 168.
35. A court extending Chevron deference will not invalidate a regulation unless it is arbitrary, capricious
or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984). The regulation need only be a reasonable interpretation of the statute, not necessarily the
best interpretation. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703
(1995).
36. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837).
37. Id. at 172-74.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 172-73.
40. Id. at 174.
41. Id. at 173-74 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) and United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995)).
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and the federal government, the only holdings in the opinion concern the
jurisdictional power granted to the Corps by the CWA statute. Consequently,
the authority of the Corps under the CWA to regulate the dredge and fill of
wetlands does not extend to isolated waters regardless of the constitutionality of a
more explicit and far-reaching statute.
B. The Application of SWANCC to the Corps' Issues
The first issue raised by the Corps in the ANPR solicitation for comments is
whether any other factor contained in the current regulatory definition of "waters
of the United States" could be used to justify its jurisdiction over isolated waters
post-SWANCC.43 In seeking an alternative regulatory justification for exercising
jurisdiction over isolated waters, the Corps has focused narrowly on the express
holding in SWANCC: "We hold that 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(3) (1999), as clarified
and applied to petitioner's balefill site pursuant to the 'Migratory Bird Rule,' 51
Fed. Reg. 41217 (1986), exceeds the authority granted to respondents under §
404(a) of the CWA." 44 The Corps seems to interpret SWANCC as having
eliminated "CWA jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, non-navigable waters
where the sole basis for asserting CWA jurisdiction is the actual or potential use
of the waters as habitat for migratory birds that cross State lines in their
migration." 45
In focusing on a constitutional justification (i.e. the Migratory Bird Rule) for
the exercise of federal authority, the Corps is misinterpreting SWANCC at a
fundamental level. The Court explicitly stated that the exercise of jurisdiction
over isolated waters is beyond the Corps' statutory grant of authority. 4 The
extent of Congress's Commerce Clause authority to regulate wetlands is simply
irrelevant.
The Corps' inquiry can be focused on the three adjectives used to modify
"waters" in the SWANCC holding: "nonnavigable," "intrastate," and "isolated." 47
Each adjective will be dealt with in turn. First, nonnavigability is easily disposed
of. Navigability in fact is not required to subject wetlands to regulation under the
CWA. The SWANCC Court implicitly (if not explicitly) reaffirmed its prior
holding in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. that Congress
intended to "regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable'
under the classical understanding of that term.' Consequently, the fact that the
42. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (presenting the Court's holding as a matter of construction
and not constitutionality).
43. ANPR, 68 Fed. Reg. 1991, 1994 (Jan. 15, 2003).
44. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
45. ANPR, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1994.
46. See supra Part II.A (reaching the conclusion that SWANCC was decided on statutory interpretation
grounds and not on constitutional grounds).
47. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172; ANPR, 68 Fed. Reg. at 1994.
48. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
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SWANCC gravel pit was not navigable in fact does not in and of itself remove it
from the Corps' jurisdiction.
Second, the term "intrastate" is the true gravamen of the Corps' inquiry. The
question of Congress's constitutional authority that was not fully engaged by the
Court in SWANCC is implicated. Although the majority refers to "intrastate"
waters in passing, the term does not enter explicitly into any analysis relevant to
the holding. 49 This is not surprising considering that the Court's analysis (other
than the Chevron dicta) dealt with statutory construction. It was the Court's
finding that the statutory authority of the Corps extended only to waters with a
"significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters"' which turns
SWANCC, and not a lack of congressional constitutional authority. ° While it may
in fact be the case that a migratory bird nexus could serve as a Commerce Clause
justification for the scope of current regulation, 5 the plain fact remains that CWA
statutory authority, as currently written, does not extend to waters isolated from
those that are considered navigable. Consequently, any alternative Commerce
Clause justification for regulating SWANCC's gravel pit, such as the collection
of shellfish, interstate recreational use, or the use of water in interstate
commerce, should also fail under the reasoning of SWANCC. 2
Based on this conclusion, it follows that determining whether the water in
question is "intrastate" or "interstate" is of no consequence to the analysis under
SWANCC. According to the Court's construction of the statute, it would not have
mattered if the gravel pit had straddled the Illinois/Indiana border. The fact
remains that the pit was isolated from navigable water. Minus a nexus to the
regulatory justification (navigable waters), any additional Commerce Clause
argument is doomed to fail. Waters factually analogous to SWANCC's gravel pit
are simply not within the Corps' statutory grant of jurisdiction. Even the dissent
in SWANCC acknowledged that the Court has not only invalidated the Migratory
Bird Rule, but has also drawn a line that "invalidates ...the Corps' assertion of

jurisdiction over all waters except for actually navigable waters, their tributaries,
and wetlands adjacent to each." 4
This leaves the examination of the term "isolated." Since SWANCC seems to
have foreclosed CWA regulation of waters based solely on a Commerce Clause
justification, it is necessary to determine what constitutes an isolated water in

133 (1985)).
49. Id. at 174.
50. id. at 167-68.
51. The Court stated that the application of the Migratory Bird Rule would raise "significant
constitutional questions" but declined to reach the issue because it was able to decide the case by narrowly
construing the statute. Id. at 172-74. The Court did recognize that the protection of migratory birds is a
"national interest of very nearly the first magnitude." Id. at 173 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435
(1920)).
52.
53.
54.

See supra Part II.A (noting the non-constitutional nature of the SWANCC holding).
See supra Part II.A (discussing the Court's consideration of the extent of that jurisdiction).
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 176-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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order to ascertain the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction. At the minimum, it should
be clear that waters analogous to the abandoned gravel pit in SWANCC are
isolated, but for a more refined inquiry, it is necessary to examine the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.55
III. DEFINING "ISOLATED" WATERS
The second part of the Corps' solicitation of comments concerns the factors
that should be used to define "isolated" waters for the purpose of the CWA.56
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the technical, hydrological and
ecological factors that should be considered, its decisions on the subject do
impart some common sense guidelines for the inquiry.
A. The JurisdictionalExtension of United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc.
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of wetlands adjacent to navigable waters and their inclusion in the
regulations promulgated by the Corps.57 Bayview Homes concerned the Corps'
assertion of jurisdiction over an 80-acre parcel of land near the shores of Lake St.
Clair in Michigan.58 The property in question was found by the Corps to meet its
regulatory definition of wetlands59 based on the presence of the requisite
vegetative and hydrologic conditions."' The Sixth Circuit found that the Corps did
not have CWA jurisdiction by inferring an additional definitional requirement
that the adjacent navigable water flood or inundate the lands with some
frequency." The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 6'
The regulatory definition of wetlands subject to CWA jurisdiction are those
lands "inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and

55. The Court returns to Riverside Bayview Homes to determine the definition of "Waters of the United
States." Id. at 167-68 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985)).
56. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (introducing the Corps' inquiry concerning the definition of
"isolated waters").
57. 474 U.S. 121 (1985) [hereinafter Bayview Homes].
58. Id. at 124.
59. Wetlands are lands "inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." Id. at 129 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1985)). The current
wetlands definition is located at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2002).
60. Id. at 124.
61. Id. at 125. The Sixth Circuit was worried that the current regulatory definition might work a
regulatory taking of private property and therefore needed to be limited. Id. The Supreme Court characterized
this concern as "spurious," id. at 129, since a valid exercise of government power at law is not limited by the
need to pay compensation in equity. Therefore, if CWA regulation works a taking, the landowner can bring an
inverse condemnation suit. Id. at 126-29.
62. Id. at 126.
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duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions."63
On the facts of Bayview Homes, it was found that the requisite vegetation was
present and that the soil saturation was caused by ground water. 64 Furthermore, it
was determined that the vegetative and hydrologic conditions extended from the
property in question to a navigable water. 65 "Together, these findings establish
that respondent's property is a wetland adjacent to a navigable waterway." 66 As
the definition of wetlands used in Bayview Homes is currently valid, 67 it would be
fair to say that contiguous wetlands extending from the edge of a navigable water
are "adjacent" and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Corps.
Justice White's opinion also extended Chevron6' deference to the Corps'
regulations defining wetlands adjacent to navigable waters as "waters of the
United States." ' Digging deeper into legislative history and the subsequent
regulatory interpretation of the Corps, the Court determined that adjacent
wetlands did not have to depend on the navigable water for inundation. ° As an
example, the Court stated that "wetlands that are not flooded by adjacent waters
may still tend to drain into those waters.",7' Furthermore, "wetlands adjacent to
lakes, rivers, streams, and other bodies of water may function as integral parts of
the aquatic environment even when the moisture creating the wetlands does not
find its source in the adjacent bodies of water., 72 The Court validated the Corps'
interpretation that wetlands "inseparably bound up with the 'waters' of the
United States" were properly regulated under section 404. 73
"The regulation of activities that cause water pollution cannot rely on...
artificial lines ... but must focus on all waters that together form the
entire aquatic system. Water moves in hydrologic cycles, and the
pollution of this part of the aquatic system, regardless of whether it is
above or below an ordinary high water mark, or mean high tide line, will
affect the water quality of the other waters within that aquatic system.
"For this reason, the landward limit of Federal jurisdiction under Section
404 must include any adjacent wetlands that form the border of or are in
63. Id. at 129 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1985)).
64. Id. at 130-31.
65. Id. at 131.
66. Id. (emphasis added).

67. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2002).
68. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
69. Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 139 (emphasis added). "We are not called upon to address the question
of the authority of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies
of open water and we do not express any opinion on that question." Id. at 131 n.8 (internal citations omitted).
70. Id. at 134.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 135.
73. Id. at 134.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 34
reasonable proximity to other waters of the United States, as these
wetlands are part of this aquatic system." 74
This leads to the logical conclusion that areas with vegetative and hydrological
attributes that meet the definition of wetlands that themselves extend to
"navigable" waters will be deemed "waters of the United States" and therefore
subject to the CWA statute.
B. Scope of the SWANCC JurisdictionalLimitation
In Bayview Homes, the question of the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction over
waters that were "not adjacent" was explicitly reserved.75 In SWANCC, the Court
found occasion to reach this issue and held that the statutory authority of the
Corps limited its jurisdiction to wetlands "inseparably bound up with the 'waters'
of the United States."" At a minimum, it is clear that a man made pit that
eventually develops the definitional vegetative conditions is nonetheless outside
the scope of section 404 regulation in the absence of a nexus to navigable
waters.77 To determine the parameters of this "nexus" is to determine what
wetlands are subject to CWA regulation.
It is clear from Bayview Homes that definitional wetlands which are contiguous
with a navigable water have the requisite nexus required under the statute.78 What is
uncertain is whether definitional wetlands with some lesser degree of connection are
nevertheless within the jurisdiction of the CWA. The vernal pool serves as a useful
wetland example for this analysis.
Vernal pools are quite common in California and support numerous endangered
species. 79 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service describes them as follows:
Vernal pools are a unique kind of wetland ecosystem. Central to their
distinctive ecology is the fact that they are vernal or ephemeral, occurring
temporarily-typically during the spring-and then disappearing until the
next year. They are wet long enough to be different in character and species
composition from the surrounding upland habitats, and yet their prolonged

74. id. at 133-34 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37128 (1977)).
75. Id. at 131 n.8.
76. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001).
77. See generally id. (discussing the "significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters,"' in
Bayview Homes).
78. Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 130-31.
79. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Critical Habitat Designation for Four Vernal
Pool Crustaceans and Eleven Vernal Pool Plants in California and Southern Oregon, 67 Fed. Reg. 59884 (Sept.
24, 2002) [hereinafter Critical Habitat Designation] (discussing vernal pools in California and Oregon).
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annual dry phase prevents the establishment of species typical of more
permanent wetlands. 8°
The Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over these pools has been called into
question by the holding in SWANCC. 8' By definition, the topography that gives rise
to vernal pools lacks significant drainage.82 "Vernal pools typically occur in
landscapes that, at a broad scale, are shallowly sloping or nearly level, but on a fine
scale may be quite bumpy. Complex micro-relief results in shallow, undrained
depressions that form vernal pools. '83 While some pools are filled by run off from
surrounding uplands, others are filled exclusively by rainfall. 4 It is likely that the
Corps' call for comments on the proper scope of wetlands for the purpose of CWA
regulation is, in part, an effort to include as many areas similar to vernal pools as
possible in the definition. To do this, the areas in question will have to meet the
regulatory definition of wetlands and the statutory limitation of being adjacent to a
navigable water.
1. Is a Vernal Pool a Wetland?
"The term wetlands means those areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically
adapted for life in saturated soil conditions."" Therefore, regulated land must
be: (1) at least saturated (2) at some frequency (3) that plant life adapted to
saturated soils is normally prevalent.86
It is clear that vernal pools are at least saturated• since
by definition they are
87
areas subject to seasonal flooding
due to poor drainage. While it is true that they89
•88
are not saturated continuously, the regulation does not require that this be so.
What is required is a frequency of saturation that supports a prevalence of plant
life adapted to such conditions.90 The vegetation endemic to vernal pools

80. Id.
81. Michelle J. Taylor, Note, Solid Waste Agency Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of Engineers:
The United States Supreme Court Invalidates the Migratory Bird Rule and Raises Questions About the
Commerce Clause, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 301, 317 (2002).
82. Critical Habitat Designation, 67 Fed. Reg. at 59885.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2002).
86. Id.
87. Critical Habitat Designation, 67 Fed. Reg. at 59884.
88. Some pools may not fill at all in a given year. Id. at 59885. The regulatory definition of wetland
accounts for this by requiring only that plant life adapted to saturated soils be "normal[ly]" prevalent. 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(b) (2002).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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certainly seems to meet this definition.9" "Vernal pool plant communities are able
to resist [non-native species] invasion because of the severe ecological
constraints [seasonal flooding and drying] on plants living in vernal pool
environments."9
2. When Is a Vernal Pool "Adjacent?"
A vernal pool could most likely be characterized as adjacent in a factual
situation similar to that of Bayview Homes. If it could be shown that the requisite
vegetative characteristics formed an unbroken connection between the pool and a
navigable waterway, it should be characterized as adjacent. 93 It is important to
keep in mind that a "navigable water" does not have to be navigable in fact; it
need only be tributary to a waterway that is navigable in fact. 94 This Bayview
Homes type of connection might be established by the swales that interconnect
the pools themselves. 95 If they were sufficiently saturated to produce a
predominance of adapted vegetation, they would provide the necessary nexus for
section 404 jurisdiction. %
A closer question concerns vernal pools that are not connected by a
contiguous band of adapted vegetation but nonetheless periodically drain across
the surface into a navigable water. Many vernal pool complexes drain into
tributaries and rivers via the connective swales often associated with vernal pool
topography. 97 These swales may have some characteristics of a wetland but often
are not sufficiently saturated for the establishment of the predominance of
wetland-adapted vegetation.98 The Court's Chevron analysis in Riverside Bayview
Homes implicitly endorses an aquatic system approach as a reasonable agency
interpretation of the statute. 99 Pollution released into adjacent wetlands "will
affect the water quality of the other waters within that aquatic system."' ' °
Therefore, navigable waters need not be the source of wetland saturation. "For
example, wetlands that are not flooded by adjacent waters may still tend to drain
into those waters."""t Consequently, if the Corps was to adopt a regulatory
91. See, e.g., Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1443-44 (1st Cir. 1992)
(discussing the environmental and ecological impact of a proposed landfill on a specific vernal pool
characterized as part of the overall wetland resource).
92. Critical Habitat Designation, 67 Fed. Reg. at 59885.
93. Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 130-31 (1985).
94. Id. at 123.
95. Critical Habitat Designation, 67 Fed. Reg. at 59885.
96. See Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 130-31 (finding section 404 jurisdiction appropriate when
considering such circumstances).
97. Critical Habitat Designation, 67 Fed. Reg. at 59885.
98. id.
99. See Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131-35 (quoting the Corps' justification for an ecosystem approach
to defining "Waters of the United States").
100. Id. at 134 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37128 (1977)).
101. Id.
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definition that included intermittent surface drainage as an appropriate nexus
between a vernal
pool and navigable waters, it is likely to be entitled to deference
02
by the courts. 1
There are some vernal pools that rarely, if ever, drain into navigable
waters. 0 These pools would certainly be the most difficult to exercise
jurisdiction over since they closely resemble the facts of SWANCC. However,
these pools do have some arguable connections with navigable waters. First, they
likely share an ecological connection with the navigable water primarily in the
form of common bird habitat. 1°4 Second, many of them likely share a common
water table with navigable waters thereby providing a subterranean hydrological
connection. '0
The Supreme Court is likely to be quite hostile to any suggestion that an
ecological connection alone is enough to establish the proper nexus; the
SWANCC dissent explicitly made this argument.'O' The majority in SWANCC
sought to place some limit on the jurisdiction of the Corps whereas an ecological
nexus would provide virtually universal wetland jurisdiction, thereby running
afoul of SWANCC.' m° The same is likely true for a ground water nexus, as it
would be difficult to find bodies of water that did not share this association with
a navigable stream.'0° Though not specifically addressed, it is arguable that the
gravel pit in SWANCC shares just such a ground water connection with some
navigable body of water. The Court's desire to place a limit on the Corps' CWA
jurisdiction casts doubt on the viability of such a theory post-SWANCC.10 9

102. See Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1443-44, 1448-50 (1st Cir.
1992) (deferring to the Corps' determinations concerning environmental and ecological impact of a proposed
landfill on the overall wetland resource including a vernal pool); see generally Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d
1285, 1291 (11 th Cir. 1999) (determining that a small-volume stream running only intermittently is "navigable
water"); Quivira Mining Co. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding
that creeks and arroyos connected to streams during intense rainfall are "waters of the United States"); United
States v. Tex. Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (1979) (concluding that an oil spill into tributary involved
"waters of the United States," even though there was no evidence that streams that connected the tributary with
navigable waters were running at time of spill).
103. Critical Habitat Designation, 67 Fed. Reg. at 59884-85.
104. The Migratory Bird Rule at issue in SWANCC was used to exert jurisdiction over isolated bodies of
water such as vernal pools. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 164-65 (2001).
105. Critical Habitat Designation, 67 Fed. Reg. at 59884-85.
106. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 176 n.2 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
107. See id (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that hydrological and ecological connections are "present in
many and possibly most, 'isolated' waters").
108. The Corps has expressed the opinion that individual pools and drainage swales are connected via
groundwater. Critical Habitat Designation, 67 Fed. Reg. at 59884-85.
109. But see Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438. 1451 (1st Cir. 1992)
(asserting that Bayview Homes calls for deference to be given to regulations dealing with groundwater
connectivity for the purposes of defining "adjacent").
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IV. CONCLUSION

Though the Supreme Court raised questions concerning the constitutionality
of a statute authorizing the regulation of isolated waters under the CWA,
SWANCC itself is not a constitutional decision. "0 Instead, the Court interpreted
the statute to limit the jurisdiction of the Corps to those waters that are "adjacent"
to a navigable waterway. t 1'
In seeking to define those waters subject to regulation, the Corps should keep
the reasoning of SWANCC in mind and focus not on the Commerce Clause, but
instead on the factors necessary to establish the required nexus. This nexus
clearly involves definitional wetlands contiguous with navigable waters and most
likely includes wetlands that periodically drain into navigable waters. But,
attempting to establish this nexus ecologically or though attenuated ground water
connections is most likely reaching beyond the jurisdiction granted by the CWA
statute.

110. See supra Part II.A (concluding that SWANCC was decided on statutory interpretation grounds).
111. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168.

